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The Aviation Paradox: 
Why we can ‘Know’ Jetliners but not Reactors
John Downer 1
2016
Forthcoming in Minerva
Abstract:
Publics and policymakers increasingly have to contend with the risks of complex, safety-
critical  technologies,  such as  airframes and reactors.  As such,  ’technological  risk’  has 
become an important object of modern governance, with state regulators as core agents, 
and ’reliability  assessment’  as  the most  essential  metric.  The Science and Technology 
Studies (STS) literature casts doubt on whether or not we should place our faith in these 
assessments because predictively calculating the ultra-high reliability required of such 
systems poses seemingly insurmountable epistemological problems. This paper argues 
that these misgivings are warranted in the nuclear sphere,  despite evidence from the 
aviation  sphere  suggesting  that  such  calculations  can  be  accurate.  It  explains  why 
regulatory  calculations  that  predict  the  reliability  of  new  airframes  cannot  work  in 
principle, and then it explains why those calculations work in practice. It then builds on 
this  explanation  to  argue  that  the  means  by  which  engineers  manage  reliability  in 
aviation is highly domain-specific, and to suggest how a more nuanced understanding of 
jetliners could inform debates about nuclear energy.2
	Global	Insecurities	Centre.	School	of	Sociology,	Politics	and	International	Studies.	University	of	Bristol.	email:	john.downer@Bristol.ac.uk.1
	I	would	like	to	thank	Anne	Harrington,	David	Demortian,	Chick	Perrow,	Trevor	Pinch,	three	anonymous	reviewers,	and	the	attendees	of	2
the	2012	Sites	of	Regulatory	Knowledge	Workshop	for	their	input	and	support	in	the	writing	of	this	paper.	All	its	shortcomings	are,	as	ever,	
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If politics means anything today it must become ‘the art of the impossible.’
~ Lewis Mumford (1954: 7)
1. Introduction
1.1 Reliability and Governance 
In a recent expert forum on nuclear energy and climate change, one participant — a 
manager involved in Chinese infrastructure — compared the engineering challenges of 
nuclear energy to those of civil aviation. Having acknowledged the existence of public 
concerns about reactors, he confidently asserted that the challenges of nuclear energy 
were amenable to the kinds of engineering and management practices that led to the 
development of safe air travel,  and predicted that public confidence would come to 
acknowledge this in time. We can build safe jetliners, in other words, so we can build 
safe reactors. 
It is not uncommon in policy discussions about technological safety to see the aviation 
and nuclear spheres invoked in ways that suggest they are equivalent or analogous in 
respect to their governmentality (e.g. Bier et al. 2003), and it is easy to see why. The 
safety challenges of reactors parallel those of jetliners in many ways. Both are similarly 
complex  systems  that  demand  similarly  extraordinary  levels  of  reliability;  the 3
industrialized world has  been manufacturing both for  roughly the  same amount  of 
time; and most polities manage their safety through ostensibly similar institutions and 
practices.  In the US, for example, rectors and jetliners are each the responsibility of a 4
dedicated  government  regulator  (the  Nuclear  Regulatory  Commission  [NRC],  and 
Federal  Aviation  Administration  [FAA],  respectively)  that  performs  various  safety-
related functions; the most fundamental of which being the formal safety assessment of 
new designs (airplanes and reactors) prior to their use. 
Jetliners  and  reactors  are  important  because  they  represent  the  vanguard  of  a 
burgeoning  number  of  complex  systems  with  the  potential  to  fail  catastrophically 
enough  that  their  performance  warrants  public  scrutiny.  The  emergence  of  these 
systems (henceforth referred to as “critical technologies”) has transformed technological 
	Reactors	meltdowns	are	much	more	consequential	than	plane	crashes	but	there	are	many	more	jetliners	than	there	are	reactors	so	the	3
per-hour	reliability	required	of	each	is	roughly	equivalent.
	We	might	say	that	their	“evaluation	cultures”	(Mackenzie	&	Spears	2014:	395)	are	highly	analogous.4
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safety into an important yet under-recognized metric of modern governance. Experts 
make strong claims about the future performance of reactors  and jetliners. (With all 5
critical technologies, it is necessary to make predictive reliability assessments. It would 
not be acceptable to design either jetliners or reactors with the understanding that their 
reliability will only become apparent over time.) And policymakers invoke these claims 
in deliberating significant policy questions pertaining to transport and energy. 
Experts are able to make strong claims about technological performance because the 
safety of critical systems is understood as a function of their ‘reliability’ (i.e. we prove 
that such systems are safe by proving that they will not fail catastrophically)  and, at 6
least on an institutional level, reliability is understood to be an objectively ‘knowable’ 
property of artifacts. Policymakers are encouraged, and often obliged, to treat expert 
reliability  assessments  as  established facts:  the  product  of  an objective  process  with 
universal principles that is applicable across technological domains (see e.g. Hilgartner 
2007: 154).  7
Perhaps  the  clearest  manifestation  of  this  is  in  debates  around  nuclear  energy,  the 
political viability of which has long been premised on declarative, formal assurances 
that meltdowns — much like meteor-strikes and alien invasions — are too improbable 
to merit genuine policy consideration (Rip 1986: 7-9; Fuller 1976: 149-186; Ramana 2011). 
This  conviction,  which  is  entrenched enough to  have  weathered several  seemingly-
disconfirmatory  meltdowns,  is  a  crucial  component  of  every  nuclear  cost-benefit 8
calculation, contingency plan and environmental analysis. It is fair to say that Western 
societies  would  make  different  technological  choices  if  they  were  less  than  entirely 
confident in their reliability assessments (see Downer 2016).
	Such	as	that	the	risk	of	being	killed	by	a	reactor	accident	is	on	the	same	order	of	magnitude	as	being	killed	by	a	meteorite	(NRC	2004).5
	This	is	to	say	that	safety	in	reactors	and	jetliners	is	formally	expressed	as	the	probability	of	catastrophic	failure,	rather	than	as	a	function	6
of	the	consequences	of	such	a	failure.	The	aviation	industry’s	working	deﬁnition	of	safety,	for	instance,	is	almost	entirely	framed	in	relation	
to	how	often	crashes	will	occur,	rather	than	how	many	people	will	survive	crashes	(Lloyd	and	Tye	1982).	The	nuclear	sphere	takes	the	same	
approach:	since	the	early	1970s,	the	NRC’s	‘risk	assessments’	have	essentially	been	‘reliability	assessments’	(Rip	1986:	7-9;	Fuller	1976:	
149-186).
	When	the	director	of	the	FAA	testiﬁed	to	the	Senate	that	“When	we	say	an	airline	is	safe	to	ﬂy,	it	is	safe	to	ﬂy.	There	is	no	gray	area.”	(in	7
Langewiesche	1998),	he	captured	an	attitude	and	idiom	that	pervades	the	discourse	of	critical-technology	regulation.	An	attitude	that	is	
especially	prevalent	in	nuclear	discourse,	where	the	NRC	explicitly	trains	its	staﬀ	to	speak	of	risk	in	terms	of	objective	certainty	(see	e.g.:	
NRC	2004).
	For	a	discussion	of	how,	see	Downer	(2014).8
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For all  the significance afforded to expert safety assessments of critical technologies, 
however,  there are  compelling reasons to imagine they do not  merit  the confidence 
invested in them. Nuclear energy’s troubled history, for instance, conspicuously is at 
odds with the idea that reactor performance is definitively predictable. And while it is 
undoubtedly true that many expert engineering calculations justifiably warrant great 
authority  —  bridge-building  societies  would  be  in  trouble  if  they  doubted  expert 
calculations of steel’s tensile strength — reliability is an unusual variable, in that it is the 
expression  of  an  absence  (i.e.  of  failure):  a  property  that  makes  it  problematic  to 
measure  in  the  manner  required  by  safety-critical  technologies  (i.e.  predictively,  at 
extremely high levels).
In what  follows,  this  paper will  outline the argument that  reliability  calculations of 
critical technologies are epistemologically implausible, and then explore it in relation to 
reactors and jetliners. Reactors are important in the context of this argument because 
reliability calculations are almost uniquely important in a nuclear context, due to the 
potentially  extreme  consequences  of  reactor  meltdowns  (see  Downer  2016),  yet  the 
validity of those calculations cannot be tested empirically, even long after reactors enter 
service. (Reactors are too few in number and too varied in design to ever accrue enough 
service data to provide a statistically significant test of the reliability predicted of them.) 
Jetliners are important in this context for a very different reason. This is that, almost 
uniquely among critical technologies, their reliability (and thus the validity of expert 
calculations that anticipate that reliability) can be assessed empirically after they enter 
service (because we build large numbers of near-identical jetliners), and, confoundingly, 
they appear to be as reliable as calculations predict. 
The reliability of jetliners speaks directly to the capabilities of technology regulators, 
and  has  wide  ramifications  for  nuclear  governance.  For  if  aviation  regulators  have 
mastered the art of ultra-high reliability prediction then it seems intuitive to infer that 
their counterparts in other spheres might have achieved the same. If we can build safe 
jetliners then why not safe reactors? 
1.2 Outline
 4
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Drawing on ideas from the Science and Technology Studies (STS) literature,  this paper 9
will  propose  an  unorthodox  account  of  critical-technology  engineering  and  its 
assessment:  an account  that  speaks  to  the  authority  of  expert  safety-claims and the 
limits of engineering rationality. 
The following section (part 2, below), outlines the ostensible logic of critical-technology 
reliability prediction, and explains why this logic should be suspect. It argues that such 
predictions are derived from tests  and models  that  are limited,  epistemologically in 
ways that preclude the kind of certainty that regulators require. It further explains that 
critical technologies ought to pose an unrealizable design challenge for the same reason 
that  they  pose  an  impossible  assessment  challenge.  Having  outlined  a  principled 
argument for why ultra-high levels of reliability ought to be impossible to achieve and 
to assess, it concludes by noting that jetliners demonstrably achieve such levels, and 
that aviation regulators demonstrably succeed in predicting them. 
The  subsequent  section,  (part  3),  explores  the  tension  between  the  dubious 
epistemology of reliability calculations and the manifest reliability of jetliners. The key 
to resolving this  tension,  it  contends,  lies  in understanding that  jetliners are neither 
assessed nor designed in the manner that engineers and regulators purport. To this end 
it introduces two institutional norms (‘recursive practice’ and ‘design stability’), which, 
it argues, allow the civil aviation sphere to manage ultra-high levels of reliability by 
leveraging service experience rather than tests and models.
The final section, (part 4), argues that civil aviation’s achievement is not generalizable to 
other technological spheres. By examining the practices outlined in the previous section 
in relation to Concorde (briefly) and the nuclear industry (in more depth), it argues that 
the ability to build and assess reliable jetliners is highly contingent and does not imply a 
similar competency with regard to reactors. The nuclear sphere, it concludes, is actually 
governed through the idealized and epistemologically-implausible processes by which 
aviation  only  purports  to  be  governed,  and  this  should  be  recognized  in  public 
discourses around reactor safety.
2. Epistemological Limits
	Many of which are articulated and justified more fully in prior research (Downer 2007; 2009; 2011a; 2011b).9
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2.1 Assessment in Principle
Assessing the performance of either a new reactor or jetliner is a forbiddingly complex 
enterprise  governed by a  kaleidoscope of  esoteric  documentation and procedure.  In 
both cases it takes hundreds of highly qualified people several years to complete, costs 
millions of dollars,  and generates literally tons of paperwork. The various practices, 
interpretations  and  conventions  involved  in  this  process  offer  rich  material  for 
sociological  scurrility  (see e.g.  Downer 2011a;  Perrin 2005).  For the purposes of  this 
paper, however, I will focus not on the nature of the task but on its epistemology. 
The  epistemology  of  technology  assessment  is  interesting  because,  as  noted  above, 
reliability is an unusual property of artifacts. Unlike mass, density, volume, or almost 
any other variable, it is a ‘negative’ property: being defined by the absence of failure. It 
is  also  an  unusually  contextual  and  interpretive  property:  being  a  function  of  the 
circumstances in which one expects a system to function and the point at which one 
deems it to have ‘failed.’ These properties can create complex issues for experts who 
would quantify the reliability of any system, but their significance is greatly accentuated 
when the reliability required is of the levels expected of critical technologies (let us call 
it ‘ultra-high’). 
There  are  several  reasons  why  reliability  calculations  poses  unique  epistemological 
challenges in the context of critical technologies. Perhaps the most fundamental is that, 
as noted above, such calculations have to be predictive. In most circumstances reliability 
is an actuarial property: one that engineers extrapolate from service data. Reliability 
assessments of infantry rifles, for example, are simply expressions of how often those 
rifles  have failed in  the  past,  combined with some basic  ceteris  paribus  assumptions 
about  the  future  (that  the  circumstances  of  their  use  and  manufacture  will  remain 
constant,  for  instance).  Critical  technologies  cannot  be  assessed  in  this  way.  Their 10
safety performance needs be assessed before they are built; usually as a condition of 
them being built.  In these circumstances, experts have to make predictive, forwards-
looking calculations that are not grounded in past service data. 
The fundamental basis for these predictive calculations are bench tests performed in 
advance  of  actual  service.  This  poses  a  problem,  however,  because  critical  systems 
	Such	assumptions	are	not	always	straightforward.	When	the	US	infantry	started	ﬁghting	Vietnam,	for	instance,	much	of	the	reliability	10
data	for	its	riﬂes	was	undermined	by	changing	disciplinary	norms	and	the	usually	humid	operating	environment.
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demand reliabilities that are higher than tests can claim to demonstrate.  A common 
requirement for critical sub-systems, for example, is an established mean-time-to-failure 
of not less than a billion hours. But a test system would have to run, failure-free, for 
over 114,000 years to demonstrate this level of performance (Rushby 1993).  Running 11
many  tests  in  parallel  reduces  this  number  but  not  to  a  practicable  level.  Instead, 
therefore,  critical  systems  are  designed  in  ways  that  make  them  measurably  more 
reliable than their constitutive sub-systems. 
To this end, engineers invoke a variety of design stratagems, the most fundamental of 
which is redundancy: the use of extra elements integrated in ways that allow one to fail 
without imperiling the wider system. A simple example would be the fact that jetliners 
have more engines than they require for flight, so that if one should fail there will still 
be enough power to effect a safe landing.  Redundancy is a useful design technique for 12
reliability,  but  it  is  also  an  invaluable  assessment  tool.  This  is  because  it  allows 
regulators  to  combine  empirical  tests  with  theoretical  models  to  demonstrate  much 
higher  levels  of  reliability  than would be possible  via  testing alone (Downer 2011a; 
2009). 
The  principle  behind this  is  simple.  When two identical  and independent  elements 
operate in parallel to form a single system, the probability of that system failing can be 
expressed as the probability that both of its elements will fail at the same time, (i.e. as 
the two probabilities multiplied by each other).  Redundant elements in a system need 13
only demonstrate a fraction of the reliability required of the system itself, therefore, and 
this means that tests of those elements can serve as an empirical basis for reliability 
assertions that are much higher than tests could establish directly. 
In broad epistemological strokes, therefore, this is how critical technology assessment 
works in principle. Regulators test the elements of a system in a lab and then combine 
the results of those tests, via redundancy calculations, to demonstrate that the system 
achieves the ultra-high levels of reliability it requires. All formal reliability assessments 
	Engineers	can	cut	this	time	by	running	parallel	tests,	but	not	even	the	most	extensive	test	program	could	plausibly	demonstrate	the	11
reliabilities	demanded	of	critical	systems.
	Engines, meanwhile, have extra valves, bolts and circuit-boards for the same reason.12
	If one element has a 0.0001 probability of failing over a given time, in other words, then the probability of two redundant elements 13
failing over the same time, is 0.00012, or 0.00000001: a ten-thousandfold increase (Littlewood et al. 2002: 781). 
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of critical systems, when stripped to their logical core, are ostensibly invoking this same 
basic combination.
In practice, however, the process is much more complicated than it appears.
2.2 The Problem of Relevance
The devil,  as always, is  in the details.  The logic outlined above hinges on tests and 
models, but academic observers of engineering practice — most notably those working 
in the STS tradition (e.g. Wynne 1988; Collins & Pinch 1998; MacKenzie 1990) — have 
routinely  found  that  tests  and  models  struggle  to  capture  the  ambiguities  of  real 
performance.  There  are  various  arguments  offered for  why this  is  so,  but  the  most 
fundamental  relates  to  what  philosophers  sometimes  refer  to  as  ‘the  problem  of 
relevance’.
The  problem  of  relevance  speaks  to  the  difficulty  of  knowing  how  closely  a 
representation of a phenomenon, like a test,  maps onto the real phenomenon that it 
purports  to  represent.  To  know  that  a  test  is  providing  accurate  information,  for 
example, testers must determine whether it sufficiently mimics the real world in all the 
ways that ‘matter’; yet there are a potentially infinite number of such determinations 
and no rigorous way of assessing their accuracy or completeness.  So it  is  that close 
studies of engineering tests frequently find that meaningful doubts and uncertainties 
surround those tests’ real-world implications (e.g. Pinch 1993; MacKenzie 1996; Downer 
2007). Mackenzie (1990), for example, shows how engineers directly involved in testing 
US  ballistic  missiles  were  privately  skeptical  about  extrapolating  from  tests  to 
operational performance due to their awareness of the tests’ hidden contingencies and 
assumptions. 
Studies of engineering models (e.g. MacKenzie 2001) illustrate the same shortcomings 
for  the  same  underlying  reasons.  The  straightforward  mathematics  of  redundancy 
outlined above, for instance, become much more ambiguous if we consider that that 
redundant  elements  might  fail  for  interconnected  reasons,  or  that  a  failure  in  one 
element might ‘propagate’ to others (Downer 2011a; Sagan 2004). Such relationships are 
impossible to idealize perfectly, and cannot be tested empirically without shackling the 
models with the relevance questions that plague tests themselves, and with the same 
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limitations  (i.e.  on  the  levels  of  reliability  they  can  plausibly  demonstrate)  that  the 
models are used to transcend.
It follows from the above, STS scholars argue, that even the most rigorous engineering 
tests and models necessarily contain uncertainties, but critics sometimes dismiss this 
point as dogmatic and inconsequential in relation to engineering. Vincenti (1990), for 
instance, describes engineering as a practical discipline that is more interested in ‘utility’ 
than in ‘truth,’ and argues that its ambitions are rarely undone by the esoteric dilemmas 
that  exercise  STS scholars.  Constant  (1999)  makes much the same point.  For  all  the 
misgivings of epistemologists, he observes, there is no denying that “most of our stuff 
works most of the time.” There is undeniable merit to this position. The philosophical 
niceties  of  representation  have  not  kept  engineers  from  realizing  pocket 
supercomputers, space rockets that land themselves on floating barges, and much else 
besides. 
At the same time, however, there are compelling reasons to believe that the problem of 
relevance  matters  to  reliability  calculations  of  critical  technologies  in  a  way  that  it 
doesn’t  to  other  engineering  endeavors.  This,  in  essence,  is  because  unlike  most 
engineering endeavors, interrogating ultra-high levels of reliability is more akin to a 
search for ‘truth’ than a search for ‘utility’. In many ways reliability can be understood 
as an expression of ‘certainty’ (i.e. that failures will not occur). So ultra-high levels of 
reliability  imply  commensurately  high  levels  of  certainty:  it  makes  little  sense  for 
nuclear  experts  to  say  they  are  ‘modestly’  sure  that  the  chance  of  a  meltdown  is 
‘extraordinarily  unlikely.’  When engineers  are  trying to  establish  that  a  system will 
operate  for  billions  hours  without  failure,  therefore,  then  even  very  marginal 
ambiguities  become meaningful.  For  these  calculations  to  be  accurate,  the  tests  and 
models  on  which  they  are  based  need  to  be  almost  perfectly  comprehensive  and 
faultless: something that the problem of relevance precludes. 
It follows from this that the reliability of jetliners and reactors should be unknowable. 
Given that the challenges of assessing the reliability of a critical technology are closely 
aligned to the challenges of designing one to be ultra-reliable, moreover — the key to 
both  lying  in  identifying  potential  weaknesses  —  then  there  are  good  reasons  to 
imagine that new reactors and jetliners should be unreliable for the same reason that 
their  reliability  is  unknowable.  So  it  is  that  investigations  of  critical-technology 
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accidents frequently identify failure conditions that engineers missed because their tests 
and models imperfectly represented the real world. Fukushima’s safety assessments, for 
example, were found to have hinged on erroneous assumptions about tsunami risks 
and misplaced premises about the independence of redundant backup-generators, and 
much else  besides.  (Elsewhere  I  have  referred  to  failures  that  arise  from erroneous 
engineering  beliefs  hidden  in  the  logic  of  tests  and  calculations  as  ‘epistemic 
accidents’ [Downer 2011b]).
This is all to say that, from an epistemological perspective at least, it is almost axiomatic 
to  conclude that  knowledge-claims and practices  requiring extraordinary degrees  of 
fidelity  from tests  and models  ought  to  be  unrealizable.  The  task  of  predicting  the 
performance of a complex system, with many variables and contingencies, over a long 
timeframe, to an exacting degree of accuracy, simply requires too many judgements to 
be made with too much perfection to be plausible. There is no way that experts should 
be able to deduce from tests and models that a yet-unrealized jetliner or reactor will be 
reliable to the extraordinary levels that they claim.
It is a conundrum, therefore, that civil aviation experts appear to do exactly that.
2.3 The Aviation Paradox
The  US  civil  aviation  sphere  exemplifies  the  practices  and  assumptions  of  modern 
critical-technology  assessment.  A state  regulator,  the  FAA,  has  to  approve  (“type-
certify”) each new jetliner design as safe (interpreted as ‘reliable’) before that design is 
allowed to carry passengers.  To this end it performs an exhaustive series of analyses 14
wherein it  assesses each system’s reliability via a process that treats reliability as an 
objectively  measurable  variable  that  can  be  definitively  established  in  advance  of 
service  data.  The  levels  of  reliability  the  FAA requires  are  extremely  demanding, 
meanwhile, with each ‘safety-critical’ system needing to demonstrate a mean-time-to-
failure of over a billion flight-hours.  And the formal justifications of how this figure 15
	The	rules	for	‘type-certiﬁcation’	are	encoded	in	a	sprawling	network	of	criteria,	stipulations	and	standards.	The	minutiae	are	an	extensive	14
pyramid	of	guidance	material	—	usually	Technical	Standard	Orders	—	that	specify	detailed	stipulations	for	each	part	and	system	of	a	civil	
aircraft,	down	to	the	last	bolt.	At	the	tip	of	this	pyramid	is	Part	25	of	the	code	of	Federal	Aviation	Regulations	(FAR-25):	the	master-
document	governing	the	design	of	large	civil	aircraft	as	an	integrated	system.
	Which	is	to	say	that	they	should	function	99.9999999	percent	of	the	time:	the	oft-cited	“nine-9s,”	(usually	expressed	as	a	probability	of	15
0.	999999999,	where	a	value	of	‘1’	represents	perfection).
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established  conform  neatly  to  the  ‘test  and  multiply’  template  outlined  above  (i.e. 
regulators invoke systems-level models to combine the results of bench tests performed 
on individual elements) (see, e.g. NTSB 2006).  
In  keeping  with  the  argument  above,  moreover,  any  close  inspection  of  the  FAA’s 
assessment calculations reveals that they are rife with problematic relevance judgments. 
Take, for example, the FAA’s ‘birdstrike’ tests, wherein it interrogates an engine’s ability 
to ingest errant avians by the (seemingly) simple expedient of spooling the engine up to 
full power and firing birds into it from a cannon. Regulators go to elaborate lengths to 
make these tests as ‘relevant’ as possible: using freshly killed birds, for instance, because 
thawed birds lose moisture.  For all  their efforts,  however,  long-running debates still 
surround many aspects of the tests. The types of birds used are contested on relevance 
grounds, for example, as are their numbers; the velocities at which they are launched; 
and much else besides (see Downer 2007). The FAA’s redundancy calculations are no 
less problematic. It may sound straightforward to add a redundant engine to the wing 
of  a  jetliner,  for  example,  but  this  simplicity  dissolves  if  we  consider  the  fact  that 
multiple engines can fail for common reasons,  or explode in ways that jeopardize the 16
whole airplane (see Downer 2011a).  17
It  follows  from  this  that  the  FAA’s  type-certification  assessments  ought  to  be 
groundless.  Logically  speaking,  experts  cannot  make  confident  ‘one-in-a-billion’ 
assertions based on a vast pyramid of tests and models that are contested and uncertain 
at every level. Yet it is difficult to deny that the assessments have usually been accurate. 
We can say this with some confidence because when the FAA has approved airplane 
types in the past, manufacturers have subsequently sold thousands of those aircraft to 
carriers, which have then operated them almost continuously for years.  Over time, 18
therefore, many airplane types have accrued so much service experience that even the 
ultra-high levels of reliability claimed of them can be tested ‘empirically’ rather than 
‘predictively’ (i.e. their reliability can be inferred statistically from the service data).  19
	Birds	tend	to	ﬂock,	for	instance,	so	the	probability	of	a	bird	striking	one	engine	is	not	‘independent’	of	the	probability	of	a	bird	striking	16
another.
	Aeronautical	engineers	work	hard	to	mitigate	such	complications	—	they	‘isolate’	engines	by	separating	them	on	the	wing,	for	instance	17
—	but	such	eﬀorts	are	never	perfect.
	Often	upwards	of	20	hours	a	day,	with	periodic	breaks	for	maintenance.18
	Albeit	with	certain	ceteris	paribus	assumptions.19
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And for most modern civil aircraft — with a telling exception that I will discuss below 
— the service data have confirmed the regulator’s assessments. Jetliners still crash, it is 
true, but extraordinarily infrequently relative to the number of operational hours they 
accrue, and rarely because of reliability issues.  Their performance is easily congruent 20
with the levels implied by reliability calculations. There is compelling evidence, in other 
words,  that  civil  aviation  experts  are  achieving  near  perfect  results  on  the  basis  of 
knowably imperfect tests and models. 
To understand how this is possible, it is necessary to understand that the rhetoric of 
aviation assessments is misleading, as experts in this sphere do not manage reliability in 
the manner they purport.
3. Reliability in Practice
3.2 Design Stability
Aviation experts  are able to negotiate the indeterminacies of  tests  and models for  a 
surprisingly straightforward reason: they do not approach reliability through tests and 
models. The FAA, in its rhetoric and documentation, presents its assessments as being 
derived from examinations of the systems themselves; as if the reliability of a system is 
an  inherent  property  of  the  design  that  tests  and  models  can  extract.  In  practice, 
however, it is truer to say that the assessments are not examining the system itself so 
much as the service history of its predecessors. Put very simply, the FAA examines how 
earlier  systems have performed in the past;  satisfies itself  that  proposed changes to 
those systems will not negatively affect that performance; and then assumes that the 
new systems will be about as reliable as their antecedents. The process is actuarial more 
than it is predictive.
Regulators are able assess new jetliners in this way because new jetliners are only ‘new’ 
in an extremely limited sense. Large civil aircraft undeniably change between ‘types,’ 
but they change so incrementally that it is highly misleading to think of a new jetliner as 
an  untested  technology  with  no  meaningful  service  record.  The  civil  aviation 
establishment is intensely suspicious of change. Modern jetliners look almost identical 
	A	stubbornly	suicidal	traveler	would	have	to	take	a	random	airline	ﬂight	every	day	for	19,000	years	to	stand	a	better-than-even	chance	of	20
succumbing	to	a	fatal	crash	(Barnett	&	Wang	1998).
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to untrained observers for reasons that go far beyond the pressures of technological 
determinism.  They look alike because new airframes, and the elements that comprise 21
them, are derivative their processors to a degree that would be extraordinary in almost 
any other engineering context. Airplane manufacturers routinely market their designs 
as revolutionary, but relative to their peers in other technological spheres they are the 
Tories  of  the  engineering  world:  they  believe  in  progress,  but  only  by  consecrating 
traditions and building on the hard-earned wisdom of their predecessors. 
Since the word ‘conservatism’ is already used in engineering circles to indicate generous 
error-margins,  I  will  refer  to  this  industry-wide norm as ‘design stability.’  It  can be 
understood as a deep institutionalized reluctance to embrace new designs, architectural 
principles or materials until they have been exhaustively explored in other contexts (in 
the  aviation sphere  this  is  invariably  the  military).  The introduction of  ‘fly-by-wire’ 
controls and new composite materials to jetliners — two of the most significant civil 
aviation innovations of recent decades — illustrate the strength of this norm. Aviation is 
a  competitive  market,  and  both  technologies  promised  very  significant  commercial 
advantages to operators (by shedding weight, and thus fuel costs), yet manufacturers 
waited until both had been used for decades in military aircraft before introducing them 
into  commercial  airframes.  Despite  the  fact  that  manufacturers  marketed  both  as 22
radical innovations, neither could really be described as untried technologies that were 
only knowable through tests and models.23
There  is  a  meaningful  sense,  therefore,  in  which manufacturers  have been carefully 
refining the same basic  airframe ‘paradigm’ for  almost  seventy years.  And,  because 
there is statistically significant evidence of how airframes built on this paradigm have 
performed in service, regulators can to leverage this stability to make useful predictions 
	One	need	only	scan	the	many	‘jetliner	of	tomorrow’	concepts	that	periodically	appear	in	the	mainstream	press,	or	simply	the	innovations	21
that	characterize	the	military	sphere,	to	see	that	there	is	nothing	inevitable	about	the	standard	airframe	paradigm.	A	wide	range	of	
technological	innovations,	such	as	blended	wing-body	designs,	promise	to	make	air	travel	cheaper	and	faster	if	manufacturers	were	more	
daring	(or,	by	the	logic	of	this	paper,	reckless).
	If	civil	aviation	designers	are	the	conservatives	of	the	aviation	world,	then	their	military	counterparts	are	its	radicals.	The	military’s	need	22
to	be	competitive,	combined	with	its	much	higher	risk	tolerance,	encourages	engineers	to	accept	the	uncertainties	of	innovation	in	pursuit	
of	marginal	combat	advantages.	In	doing	so,	it	builds	aircraft	that	are	orders	of	magnitude	less	reliable	than	their	civil	counterparts,	and,	
almost	inadvertently,	provides	an	unoﬃcial	test	program	for	civil	aviation.	The	trajectory	of	military	aviation	design	hints	at	a	path	that	civil	
manufacturers	might	have	followed	if	not	constrained	by	reliability.	A	jetliner	that	embraced	aeronautical	principles	found	in	contemporary	
military	aircraft	(such	as	the	blended	wing-body	design	of	the	B-2	bomber,	for	example)	might	oﬀer	considerable	advantages	over	its	rivals	
in	terms	of	range,	speed,	capacity,	eﬃciency	and	environmental	impact	(see	e.g.	Stewart	2014).
	Slayton	and	Spinardi	(2016)	ﬁnd	that	many	aviation	engineers	construe	the	transition	to	composites	as	a	radical	innovation.	For	the	23
purposes	of	this	paper,	however,	it	makes	little	sense	to	construe	innovativeness	as	an	actor’s	category,	and,	if	anything,	their	ﬁnding	
testiﬁes	eloquently	to	the	industry’s	highly	conservative	interpretation	of	innovation.
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about new airframes.  Aviation experts can avoid basing their assessments on tests and 24
models,  in  other  words,  because  they have service  data  on which to  draw instead. 
Epistemologically speaking, the reliability of jetliners is established in much the same 
way as that of rifles. 
3.3 Recursive Practice
The process of achieving (as opposed to assessing) reliable designs is worth considering 
separately. As noted above, the inherent ambiguities of tests and models are liable to 
cause  accidents  as  well  as  assessment  errors,  and,  as  such,  pose  a  dilemma for  an 
airframe’s  designers  as  well  as  for  its  regulators.  While  regulators  can make useful 
reliability predictions on the basis of good service data and a strong commitment to 
design stability, however, ’achieving’ ultra-high levels of reliability requires something 
more: a commitment to learning and incremental refinement. 
The aviation industry owes much of its current level of safety to decades of assiduously 
mining its misadventures. It explores its failures for insights that allow it to hone its 
understandings, and thus its designs. A litany of aviation accidents and near misses 
have provided insights that have led to subtle, and often highly specific, refinements of 
airframe  designs  (and  of  the  tests  and  calculations  that  inform  those  designs)  (see 
Downer 2011b).  The reason that all airplanes have oval windows, for example, dates 25
back to the loss of two De Havilland Comets in 1953 and 1954. The accidents revealed 
that the airplane’s rectangular windows were inducing stress fractures at the corners: 
something  that  pressurization  tests  had  failed  to  reveal  because  they  imperfectly 
represented some significant variables (Faith 1996).
Constant  (1999)  calls  this  incremental  learning  ‘recursive  practice,’  and  like  design 
stability, it is deeply ingrained in the culture of civil aviation.  The industry, often with 26
state  support,  goes  to  extraordinary  lengths  to  identify  the  causes  of  its  failures. 
	There	are,	to	be	sure,	uncertainties	involved	even	in	the	most	modest	innovation.	Subtle	diﬀerences	arising	from	new	conﬁgurations	or	24
operating	environments	sometimes	prove	to	be	fateful,	for	example.	Yet	such	uncertainties	are	much	more	manageable	than	those	
involved	in	assessing	an	entirely	unproven	technology.
	Boeing,	for	instance,	diligently	compiles	insights	from	service	experience	into	a	volume	—	‘Design	Objectives	and	Criteria’	—	which	acts	as	25
a	canonical	text	in	the	planning	stages	of	its	new	jetliners.	
	This	is	visible,	for	instance,	in	the	industry’s	unusually	far-reaching	commitment	to	codifying	the	lessons	of	its	missteps	and	false	26
assumptions	(e.g.	Macrae	2013).
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Sometimes  spending  years  reconnoitering  inhospitable  ocean  floors  in  pursuit  of  a 
crucial design insight. Few, if any, engineering endeavors can compare.
3.4 The Foundations of Safety  
We might say that ‘service history,’ ‘design stability,’ and ‘recursive practice’ together 
make a three-pronged scaffold on which the epistemology of civil aviation rests. Alone 
they do not count for much, but in combination they allow manufacturers to defy the 
epistemic limitations of tests and models to achieve, and predict, extraordinary levels of 
reliability.  A  deep  well  of  service  experience  creates  a  set  of  occurrences  (some 
catastrophic)  that  tests  and  models 
alone could never predict. Investigating 
those  occurrences  reveals  insights  that 
allow  for  design  refinements.  And 
keeping  designs  stable  (in  other 
respects)  helps  ensure  that  those 
refinements  continue  to  be  relevant; 
thereby making the effects of refinement 
cumulative and useful. 
Figure 1 maps the relationships between 
these principles as a crude schematic. It 
illustrates  several  points  worth 
reiterating:
i. Design stability helps create relevant service experience. The greater the similarity 
between  past  and  present  designs,  the  more  useful  and  representative  the 
industry’s service history becomes to experts hoping to predict the performance of 
the future aircraft.
ii. Design stability and extensive service experience are both necessary preconditions 
for  successful  recursive  practice.  Service  experience  is  necessary  for  recursive 
practice because kinds of misconstruals that evade expert tests and models usually 
only  become  apparent  in  rare  and  unusual  circumstances,  thus  it  takes  many 
operational  hours  to  draw  them  out.  Design  stability  is  necessary  because  the 
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insights  that  engineers  glean  from  investigating  their  misconstruals  tend  to  be 
highly  specific  rather  than  broadly  generalizable,  thus  many  become  irrelevant 
when designs change. Hoarding insights means keeping systems stable,  in other 
words, even if it means forgoing or delaying innovations that promise commercial 
benefits.   27
iii. Recursive  practice  is  a  necessary  precondition  for  ‘achieving’  the  levels  of 
reliability required of critical systems, but not for ‘predicting’ that reliability. All 
that is needed to predict the reliability of a new system is compelling evidence that 
it is substantially similar to a previous system, combined with good data on how 
often that previous system has failed in the past. Recursive practice only becomes 
important insofar as engineers are looking to improve the safety of a system.
4. Generalizability 
4.1 The Exceptional Jetliner
The picture of aviation design and assessment outlined above implies that the way that 
policymakers think about critical technology governance is misleading. By this view, 
aviation  regulators  did  not  learn  the  secret  to  predicting  the  reliability  of  complex 
technologies in general so much as they slowly and empirically learned the reliability of 
a  highly  specific  airframe  design.  Manufacturers,  meanwhile,  did  not  discover  a 
formula for designing ultra-reliable systems in general,  so much as they slowly and 
painfully learned to make a specific airframe design ultra-reliable.  Both assiduously 28
mined the industry’s service record to refine their understanding of a specific design 
paradigm, and then worked hard not to deviate from that paradigm. Crucially, the fruits 
of  this  process  are  not  generalizable  across  technological  spheres  or  even  across 
technologies in the same sphere. Anyone wishing to hone (or assess) a fundamentally 
different  design  to  similar  level  of  reliability  would  have  to  start  almost  from  the 
beginning. 
	This,	incidentally,	is	why	airframe	manufacturers,	who	operate	in	a	competitive	marketplace,	are	willing	to	delay	adopting	many	27
seemingly	advantageous	innovations:	they	recognize	that	it	is	essential	to	reliability	and	that	unreliability,	or	even	the	perception	thereof,	
can	be	a	commercial	disaster.	As	Perrow	(1999)	points	out,	the	aviation	industry	has	structural	incentives	to	favor	safety.
	The	demands	of	ultra-high	reliability	create	a	strong	‘path	dependency’.28
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A good way to illustrate the truth of this is to consider a civil jetliner that conspicuously 
violated the standard design paradigm: Concorde.29
Anyone  looking  for  an  airplane  that  flaunted the  principles  of  design  stability  and 
recursive practice could hardly hope for a better example than Concorde. The trans-
sonic  airplane  broke  so  radically  with  the  standard  airframe  paradigm  that  many 
aviation historians consider it to be an entirely different class of vehicle to a traditional 
jetliner (e.g. Loftin 1985; Schrader 1989). Its cruising speed of 1,354 mph — over twice 
that of any jetliner in operation today — was a remarkable engineering feat, but one 
with extensive design ramifications. Aerodynamically, for example, it necessitated the 
‘double delta’ wing shape responsible for Concorde’s instantly recognizable silhouette. 
The wings,  in  turn,  forced the plane to land at  an unusually steep angle,  requiring 
unorthodox landing gear and a nose that moved so pilots could see the runway. The air 
friction at high speeds, meanwhile, required special heat-resistant alloys and subjected 
them  to  unprecedented  fatigue  loads.  It  also  required  an  unprecedented  cruising 
altitude,  which  led  to  unique  pressurization  considerations.  As  a  result  of  these 
demands,  and  many  others  like  them,  the  airplane  embodied  a  spectrum of  ideas, 
technologies and manufacturing techniques that were new to civil aviation (Owen 2001; 
Orlebar 1997). 
Concorde  is  often  remembered  as  having  an  impressive  safety  record  despite  its 
architectural  audacity,  but  this  is  highly  misleading.  It  entered  service  in  1976  and 
retired twenty-seven years later  in 2003.  During this  period it  had only one serious 
accident: Air France Flight 4590, which crashed on takeoff from Paris in July of 2000. For 
most  jetliners,  twenty-seven years  of  operation with only one disaster  would be an 
extraordinary  record:  compelling  evidence  that  ultra-high reliability  was  compatible 
with  radical  innovation.  This  record  needs  to  be  understood  in  context,  however. 
Concorde had an anomalous market share as well as an exceptional design. Only 14 
ever entered service, and even at peak service they flew far fewer hours per day than 
other jetliners. As a result, it accrued far fewer flight hours than other designs. (It made 
about 50,000 flights total, whereas the Boeing 737, by contrast, made about 232 million 
flights over same period.) 
	The	airplane	has	an	uncommon	nomenclature,	in	that	it	does	not	receive	an	article	in	common	English	usage	(i.e.	It	is	not	The	Concorde.).	29
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Concorde’s extremely modest service history is  essential  to understanding its  safety. 
Statistically speaking, its  one accident made the airplane an order-of-magnitude less 
reliable  than  more  traditional  airframes.  Its  designers  broke  with  the  conventional 
design  paradigm  for  civil  jetliners  and  the  airplane  paid  the  price  in  reliability. 
Regulators were wrong about its safety and should have refused to approve it on the 
grounds  that  its  design  was  too  unprecedented,  (and without  the  enormous  Ango-
French political investment in its success they would likely have done so).  It is telling 30
that no manufacturer has seriously attempted anything similar since.31
4.2 Nuclear Insecurities
The inability of civil aviation manufacturers and regulators to achieve with Concorde 
what  they achieved with  other  jetliners  underlines  the  specificity  of  their  reliability 
accomplishments. This specificity is important to the nuclear sphere because, as noted, 
reactors  are  equivalent  to  jetliners  in  important  respects  and  are  assessed  in  an 
ostensibly similar manner (via a formal reliability calculation overseen by a dedicated 
government regulator).  When considered in light of the discussion above, however, 32
any apparent equivalences between the aviation and nuclear spheres begin to break 
down. 
To understand the nuclear sphere’s relationship to reliability, it necessary to appreciate 
its  dearth  of  statistically  significant  service  experience.  The  number  of  active 
commercial reactors in operation around the world is tiny relative to the number of 
jetliners. In 2011, prior to Fukushima, there were roughly 400 operational reactors, a 
number is so small that — even if each reactor had begun its operational life at the 
dawn of the nuclear age, and there had never been a single nuclear accident — their 
	It	is	telling	in	this	context,	that	Concorde’s	airworthiness	certiﬁcate	was	withdrawn	immediately	after	the	disaster:	grounding	the	entire	30
ﬂeet	for	over	a	year	until	extensive	design	modiﬁcations	had	been	implemented.	A	measure	that	is	almost	unique	in	modern	civil	aviation.	
It	is	also	worth	noting	that	a	contributory	factor	to	2000	accident	was	the	fact	that	airplane	combined	multiple	engines	in	single	housings:	
a	design	decision	that	regulations	expressly	forbid	in	other	jetliners.	
	The	unhappy	history	of	Concorde’s	Russian	cousin,	the	Tupolev	Tu-144,	only	serves	to	reinforce	the	point.	The	airplane	entered	passenger	31
service	in	November	1977,	and	ceased	in	1978	after	55	service	ﬂights.	The	airplane	accrued	two	crashes	in	its	lifetime.
	Both	invoke	the	‘test-and-multiply’	formula	to	justify	predictive	reliability	assertions	that	could	not	be	grounded	on	tests	alone.32
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cumulative  error-free  operational  hours  would  be  insufficient  (by  an  order  of 
magnitude) to statistically demonstrate the levels of reliability its regulator requires.33
This lack of service experience is exacerbated, moreover, by the fact that the nuclear 
manufacturers  evince  far  less  of  a  commitment  to  design  stability  than  their 
counterparts in civil aviation. It would be wrong to say that nuclear architects do not 
adhere  to  any  common  paradigms,  but  even  within  the  small  pool  of  operational 
reactors the disparity between designs dwarves that of jetliners. 
Reactor designs can be envisioned as a many-branched family tree.  At the broadest 
level, they can be divided into ‘types’ based on their fundamental operational principles 
(Pressurized Water Reactors; Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors; Boiling Water Reactors; 
Gas cooled Reactors, Molten Salt Reactors, and several others). In turn, these ‘types’ can 
be divided into ‘generations,’  each representing very considerable design differences 
(the industry regularly divides Pressurized Water Reactors into three generations, for 
example). Even reactors of the same type and generation, meanwhile, are ‘bespoke’ in 
the  sense  that  they  are  tailored  by  their  manufacturers  (which,  again,  are  more 
numerous and diverse than in aviation) to suit specific local conditions (such as seismic 
and  flood  risks):  a  process  that  creates  significant  variations  between  otherwise 
‘identical’ plants. 
The  degree  of  variation  between  reactors  means  that  the  performance  of  one  says 
relatively little about the performance of others. As was evinced, for instance, in the 
aftermath of the Chernobyl and Fukushima disasters, when nuclear experts repeatedly 
highlighted the irrelevance of those designs to the safety of other plants around the 
world (see Downer 2014).  This lack of relevance further undermines the usefulness of 34
the industry’s already thin service data. 
Nuclear’s lack of service experience and design stability have complex ramifications 
that profoundly shape its relationship to reliability: 
	It	is,	of	course,	it	ought	to	be	much	more	feasible	to	statistically	demonstrate	a	low	level	of	reliability.	Major	accidents	have	occurred	far	33
more	frequently	than	oﬃcial	reliability	assessments	have	predicted.	The	exact	numbers	very,	depending	on	how	one	classiﬁes	‘an	accident’	
(whether	Fukushima	counts	as	one	meltdown	or	three,	for	example),	but	Ramana	(2011)	puts	the	historical	rate	of	serious	meltdowns	at	1	
in	every	3000	reactor	years,	while	Taebi	et	al.	(2012:	203fn)	put	it	at	somewhere	between	one	in	every	1300	to	3600.	For	an	examination	of	
why	nuclear	safety	claims	have	not	been	falsiﬁed	by	these	events	see	Downer	(2014).
	This	is	the	logical	basis	on	which	formal	reliability	studies	exclude	past	accidents	from	their	analyses,	(Although	the	same	logic	should	34
preclude	any	historical	reliability	assessment.	For	it	follows	that	if	evidence	of	accidents	is	not	statistically	relevant	then	neither	is	evidence	
of	‘non-accidents’.)
 19
13.0
i. Firstly, they make it impossible to retroactively assess the credibility of reactor safety 
calculations. With no statistically relevant service experience, there is no empirical 
evidence to indicate whether even the longest-serving reactors are as safe or reliable 
as experts calculated.  (And with so many differences between plants, even those 35
reactors that fail can be dismissed as having very limited significance).
ii. Secondly, and relatedly, they keep the NRC from assessing reactors in the same way 
that  the  FAA assess  jetliners.  As  discussed,  the  FAA can  usefully  predict  the 
reliability of a new airframe, despite the limitations of its tests and models, because: 
a)  it  knows  the  airframe  is  very  similar  to  other  airframes,  and  b)  it  knows, 
statistically, how reliable those airframes have been in service. The NRC has neither 
advantage. It must actually predict the reliability reactors in the manner that aviation 
regulators  just  purport  to  predict  reliability  of  airframes  —  from  the  tests  and 
models, with all their manifest epistemological shortcomings. 
iii. Thirdly, and finally, they make recursive practice far more difficult in the nuclear 
sphere than in aviation.  Nuclear  manufacturers  do endeavor to  learn from their 
limited  service  experience  (see  e.g.  Perrin  2005:  xi),  and  there  are,  to  be  sure, 
generalizable lessons learned from nuclear mishaps. (Post-Fukushima reactors are 
unlikely to be designed with all their backup generators underground, for example.) 
Yet  these  lessons  are  of  a  different  order  to  those  collected  by  aviation 
manufacturers,  which  often  involve  insights  into  very  specific  design  details  in 
highly  uncommon  situations.  The  large  disparities  between  reactor  designs 36
coupled with the small number of reactors in operation mean that the lessons of 
experience  are  fewer,  and  their  usefulness  far  lower,  than  in  aviation.  As  a 
consequence nuclear architects, like nuclear regulators, are also more dependent on 
tests  and  models  than  their  aviation  counterparts.  In  theory,  this  should  make 
reactors  much  more  susceptible  to  disasters  arising  from  undiscovered 
misjudgments hiding in their designs (‘epistemic accidents’). It follows from this, 
therefore, that reactors should less reliable than jetliners for the same reason that 
their reliability is less knowable.
	Aside	from	those	plants	that	failed	unequivocally.	These	were	indubitably	less	safe	than	experts	calculated,	but	the	industry	35
enthusiastically	contests	their	relevance.
	Such	as	the	manner	in	which	metal	fatigues	between	certain	rivet	conﬁgurations,	when	combined	with	speciﬁc	manufacturing	36
imperfections	and	an	unusually	moist,	saline	operating	environment	(See	Downer	2011b).
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This  is  all  to  say  that  design  and  assessment  practices  are  not  equivalent  across 
technological domains, even if they are often presented as such. Nuclear and aviation 
regulation  look  like  very  similar  undertakings,  and reactors  and jetliners  appear  to 
present analogous engineering challenges, but the means by which regulators ‘know’ 
the reliabilities of these systems, and the means by which manufacturers have pursued 
reliability  in  their  designs,  are  necessarily  different.  The  aviation  sphere,  with  its 
expansive  service  experience  and  longstanding  commitment  to  design  stability,  is 
epistemically privileged in a way that the nuclear sphere is not, and it has leveraged this 
privilege to make accurate predictions and build safe airplanes in a way that its nuclear 
counterparts cannot replicate.
There are no shortcuts to achieving or assessing reliability in critical technologies. The 
safety  of  modern  aviation  and  the  accuracy  of  its  reliability  assessments  are  both 
inseparable from the industry’s long, slow and sometimes painful history. Those who 
misunderstand this are prone to adopt an idealized and misleading understanding of 
engineering  knowledge:  one  that  implies  a  generalizable  level  of  technological 
comprehension and competence that can be dangerous in spheres where it  does not 
belong. This is important. For while it may be true, as an old adage puts it, that mastery 
is most often achieved by those who don’t know that failure is inevitable,  the same 
cannot be said of prudent policymaking.
4.3 Considering Uncertainty
The  question  of  what  would,  in  fact,  constitute  prudent  policymaking  in  these 
circumstances is complex and deserving of fuller consideration than can be afforded 
here. Broadly speaking, however, it would require us to consider the choices we would 
make if  we understood that:  a)  the  probability  of  reactor  meltdowns cannot  not  be 
objectively known; and b) the reliability of reactors is likely to be lower than current 
assessments predict. 
While it is impossible to know where exactly such a reconsideration might lead, it is 
possible to identify some of the broad policies that might need to be rethought. One, for 
instance, would be the manner in which reactor safety is analyzed and assessed. Early 
US  reactor  safety  assessments,  such  as  the  1957  ‘WASH-740’  study,  explored  the 
potential  consequences  of  major  disasters.  As  noted  above,  however,  the  1975 
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‘WASH-1400’ study put an end to such scrutiny by ‘proving’ that major disasters were 
too improbable to merit consideration. Recognizing the epistemological uncertainties of 
such proofs suggests a reevaluation of this approach and, potentially, a return to the 
former practice of scrutinizing the consequences of accidents as well as their likelihood.
By the same logic,  it  is  likely that we would want to reconsider a range of matters 
pertaining  to  ‘resilience’.  The  institutional  understanding  that  reactor  reliability  is 
objectively  calculable  not  only  forecloses  the  study  of  disasters,  it  also  curtails  the 
planning around them. As it stands, for instance, the US (as with all nuclear states) does 
little to prepare for serious meltdowns (again on the basis that they are too improbable 
to merit serious consideration). This is reflected in evacuation procedures, for example, 
which are framed around small leaks rather than catastrophic failures (Clarke & Perrow 
1996).  It  is  similarly  reflected  in  the  NRCs  fallout  models,  which,  at  the  time  of 
Fukushima  at  least,  were  only  designed  to  predict  radioactive  dispersion  up  to  a 
distance of 50 miles (Lochbaum et al. 2014). More fundamentally, it is reflected in reactor 
siting decisions. As Perrow (1999) points out,  it  is common practice for operators to 
‘cluster’  multiple reactors on single sites.  This clustering has economic and political 
advantages, but as Fukushima amply illustrated, it creates the potential for a failure of 
one reactor  to  jeopardize others.  It  is  arguably a  practice  that  would be difficult  to 
justify in a climate that recognized the evitiability of major accidents.
Most fundamentally of all, of course, we may want to reconsider the viability of nuclear 
energy in general. In the early 1970’s, the shift in the way US reactors were assessed — 
the formal exclusion of accident analyses on the basis of probability — was driven by a 
widespread belief that the political viability of rectors would be undermined by a public 
exploration of potential  disasters and their consequences (Rip 1986:  7-9;  Fuller 1976: 
149-186). Whether this belief was correct at the time, or would still hold today, is an 
open question. And so long as the safety of reactors is understood to be as knowable 
(and as achievable) as that of jetliners, that question is unlikely to be answered.
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